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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-2154
___________
RUDY STANKO,
Appellant
v.
BARACK OBAMA, Commander and Chief (Art. II, Section 2);
WARDEN DAVID EBBERT
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01911)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones, III;
previously, Honorable James F. McClure, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 9, 2011
Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 29, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________

PER CURIAM
Rudy Stanko, a federal prisoner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The District Court

dismissed the petition, ruling that Stanko=s claims were not appropriately brought in
habeas because he did not challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Stanko
appealed.
We affirmed the District Court’s order insofar as it had dismissed Stanko’s claims
about the conditions of his confinement because, as the District Court had pointed out,
Stanko could not present such claims in a habeas petition. See Stanko v. Obama, 398 F.
App’x 777, 778 (3d Cir. 2010). However, we vacated the order to the extent that it had
dismissed Stanko’s challenge to the validity of disciplinary proceedings that had served
to lengthen the time that he would spend in jail. See id. at 778-79 (citing, among other
cases, Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1997)).
On remand, in accordance with our mandate, and after soliciting a response from
the warden 1 and allowing a reply from Stanko, the District Court considered Stanko’s
claims that sounded in habeas. The District Court denied Stanko’s petition. Stanko
appeals.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1291. We “exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its
1

The District Court dismissed President Obama as a party to this action because a
writ of habeas corpus is properly directed to a petitioner’s custodian, see 28 U.S.C. §
2243, in this case the warden of the facility where Stanko was confined at the time he
filed his petition, see Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004). (As the District
Court also noted, Stanko’s transfer to another prison, which was not authorized pursuant
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, did not divest it (or us) of
jurisdiction over this case. See Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (3d Cir. 1990);
cf. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441; Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944).
2

findings of fact.” See O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005); see also
United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1531, 1542 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Our review of the district
court’s order denying . . . relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is plenary.”). Upon review, we
will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment because no substantial issue is
presented on appeal. See Local Rule 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Stanko alleged that his right to due process of law was violated in the disciplinary
proceedings which resulted in the loss of 27 days of good conduct time. 2 Due process
protections attach in prison disciplinary proceedings in which the loss of good-time
credits is at stake. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1974). In Wolff, the
Supreme Court held that an inmate must receive “(1) advance written notice of the
disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense;
and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for
the disciplinary action.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).
In Hill, the Supreme Court further explained that to meet the minimum
requirements of due process, the findings of the prison disciplinary board must also be
supported by some evidence in the record. See id. The “some evidence” standard “does
2

He also argued that his disciplinary hearing and its result constituted an unlawful
bill of attainder, but this argument is a non-starter. See United States v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 384 n.30 (1968) (defining a bill of attainder as “a legislative Act which inflicts
punishment on named individuals or members of an easily ascertainable group without a
judicial trial”). Neither a disciplinary hearing nor its result was a legislative act and thus,
neither could constitute a bill of attainder.
3

not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of
witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455. “[T]he relevant question is whether
there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the
disciplinary board.” Id. at 455-56.
As the District Court explained with citations to the record, Stanko received
advance written notice of the disciplinary charge on February 5, 2009, upon completion
of the investigation into whether he had made threats that he would file liens against
prison staff members. On that same day, he received notice of his rights in disciplinary
proceedings. Stanko’s hearing was held on February 12, 2009. At his hearing, where he
was represented by an appointed staff member, Stanko had the opportunity to present
evidence and call witnesses. Stanko, himself, provided a statement at his hearing; he also
presented a statement from another witness (the inmate who notarized the documents
containing the language construed as threats). At the conclusion of his hearing, Stanko
was given a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary action against him. In short, Stanko received the procedural protections set
forth in Wolff.
Furthermore, there is evidence in the record to support the finding of the
disciplinary hearing officer that Stanko had “interfered with staff in the performance of
their duties, most like, threatening another with any other offense.” Stanko contended
that he was merely filing requests for administrative remedies and did not, and was not
attempting to, file a lien against any staff members. However, within the documents that
4

Stanko deemed requests for administrative remedies, Stanko included language that if the
claims were not “rebutted point for point categorically within three (3) months,” they
would become liens on all property and rights of the prison officials he named. He stated
that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would serve as a “surety” and pay any money due not
covered by the liens. At his hearing, Stanko asserted that he felt that he had “a right to
file this with surety.” Accordingly, there is some evidence in the record that Stanko
interfered with staff in the performance of their duties by making threats to file liens. As
the District Court noted, the penalties imposed were consistent with sanctions set forth in
the relevant regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13.
Stanko made an additional argument, which the District Court misconstrued. The
District Court took Stanko’s statements about the prison’s non-compliance with the “24hour rule” to be a claim that Stanko did not receive advance notice of the charge (which
he clearly did, see supra). Stanko instead (or additionally) asserted that his right to due
process was violated because he was not charged with a disciplinary infraction within 24
hours of the time at which staff became aware of his involvement in the incident. See 28
C.F.R. § 541.15(a) (stating that the written charges “ordinarily” should be given to the
inmate within that time period). According to Stanko and at least some of the prison’s
records, the incident occurred, or prison officials became aware of the incident, on
December 10, 2008. It is undisputed that Stanko did not get notice of the charge until
February 5, 2009, one day after the conclusion of an investigation on February 4, 2009.

5

However, even if the regulation were violated, its violation is not actionable in this
case. Stanko cannot show that his right to due process was violated by a possible
technical non-compliance with the regulation where Wolff does not require issuance of
the charge within 24 hours of the incident and where any delay did not prejudice him.
See Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 2003); Von Kahl v. Brennan, 855 F.
Supp. 1413, 1421 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (explaining that “at least in situations where the
minimal requirements of due process have been met, an inmate must show prejudice to
the rights sought to be protected by the regulation claimed to be violated”). Also,
although Stanko has a liberty interest in his good time credits, he did not show that the
regulation itself created a liberty or property interest such that its violation abridged his
due process rights. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).
For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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